This paper presents estimates, for more than 160 countries, of the fraction of the adult population using formal financial intermediaries. The estimates are constructed by combining information on banking and MFI account numbers (together with banking depth and GDP data) with estimates from household surveys for a smaller set of countries. The resulting data are compared econometrically with information on poverty and inequality.
Introduction and Summary
This paper presents estimates across some 160 countries of the fraction of the adult population using formal (or semi-formal) financial intermediaries, whether through deposit accounts or by borrowing. The estimates are constructed by combining information (assembled by others) about banking and MFI account numbers (together with banking depth and GDP data) with estimates from household surveys for a smaller set of countries. The resulting data are compared with information on poverty and inequality. There is some evidence that better household access to finance is associated with lower inequality, but not that access is causally related to a lower poverty headcount.
The financial sector plays a multidimensional role in the process of development. It mobilizes and concentrates resources for investment and allocates them based on an assessment of risk and return, judging creditworthiness and monitoring performance; it offers risk-reduction and risk-pooling services that have both direct effects on welfare (by providing insulation from shocks) and indirect effects on growth, by making riskier -but potentially high-yield -investments in human and physical capital accessible. While much of the recent literature focuses on the interaction of enterprises, large and small, with financial markets and financial intermediaries, households are important consumers of financial products and household behavior influences the scale and asset mix of finance (Honohan, 2006) .
Because financial asset holdings are highly concentrated, even more so than nonfinancial assets, the assets of the lower quartiles can be largely ignored in any discussion of national resource mobilization or aggregate financial wealth. Nevertheless (and as is confirmed in regressions reported in Section 3), it appears that countries with deeper financial systems have less absolute poverty, even after taking account of mean national income. This suggests that a deep financial system also affects the structure of the economy in indirect ways that are relevant for the inclusiveness of economic development.
However, as elaborated in Section 1 below, it is possible that poverty and inequality could be strongly influenced by the degree to which low income households have access to savings, risk pooling and payments services provided the formal financial sector.
Indeed, the main focus of current policy concern with regard to household finance in developing countries is the perceived need to increase the access of poor households to basic financial services: deposits, payments, insurance and credit.
Relevant policies include regulatory design for microfinance institutions designed to ensure that measures intended to protect consumers against loss do not impose costs so heavy as to deter entry into this low end of the market, which is characterized by low margins despite the potentially high volume. The same applies to the design of AML/CFT measures intended to protect the integrity of the financial system against money laundering or its use to finance terrorism; the application of these measures to providers of financial services at the small scale needs to be proportionate to the risks involved and adapted to the capacity of the providers to comply.
Yet the body of research on what impact microfinance has had on poverty is surprisingly inconclusive. Although beneficiaries of microfinance schemes are vocal in their praise and gratitude, a comprehensive assessment needs to consider displacement effects and endogeneity of financial access. Only in a few cases so far has it been possible to devise convincing ways of adjusting for, or excluding, these complicating factors. On balance, most observers regard microfinance interventions as poverty-reducing, while continuing to call for further analysis of methodologies for increasing cost-effectiveness and sustainability of these initiatives. After all, most of them continue to benefit from external subsidies.
An alternative approach to detecting a direct influence of financial access on poverty and inequality requires the assembly of cross-country data. Quantifying household access on a cross-country basis is the focus of Section 2. This describes and implements a method for combining data on client and account numbers at microfinance institutions and banks with the results of household surveys in a number of countries and macroeconomic data to generate a composite estimate of the fraction of adults using 1 the services of formal 2 financial intermediaries. The data clearly shows that this percentage is small in most developing countries. In contrast, access percentages in the 80s and 90s are recorded for households in advanced economies (where the relevant policy issues are therefore best discussed in the language of exclusion rather than of access).
Section 3 presents econometric evidence on the correlation between the new access data and poverty and inequality measures. Access percentages are correlated with poverty rates and national per capita income, but not very closely. More important, conditioning on mean national income, the partial correlation become insignificant. Intriguingly, then, the strongest cross-country econometric evidence for a financial sector impact on poverty relates to financial depth (here the total value of private credit in relation to GDP), and not financial access (percentage of households with an account).
On the other hand the new financial access percentages are somewhat more robustly correlated across countries with inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, suggesting that better access lowers inequality. Inclusion of mean income and other variables does not eliminate the correlation (at least for the main subsample being used).
In contrast, bank credit depth seems to lack explanatory power for the Gini coefficient.
Casting our eyes to the bottom of the pyramid, we need to remind ourselves that, for lower income groups, the relevant question concerning their financial assets is not related to how much financial assets they choose to hold, and even less to how much they might choose to borrow from the financial system. These households encounter barriers to accessing financial services at all. 3 This has led to a growing debate around the issue of financial exclusion in the advanced economies, where it is noted that a small but multiply-deprived group -perhaps 10 percent of the adult population -do not have access to financial services such as a transactions account, or even a savings account, much less a loan from a formal intermediary or an insurance policy.
In some cases product features, such as a high minimum cover for an insurance product, or heavy penalties for unauthorized overdrafts (hard for poor people to avoid if they are using checking accounts), or having a fixed address as a pre-requisite to open an account, represent material obstacles to use of such products. In other cases customers may be screened-out because of risk characteristics. Or rationalization of branches and service points may result in many poor customers having too far to travel to a branch to make an account worthwhile. Given the increasing extent to which full participation in economic life in the advanced economies depends on having an account at a financial intermediary, and given the material extra costs often imposed on non-account holders, several countries have adopted policies in recent years to reduce financial exclusion (Porteous, 2004; Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux, 2005; Kempson, 2006; Kempson et al., 2000) .
In low and middle-income countries, though, 'exclusion' is normal for the bulk of the population, hence it becomes more natural to speak of broadening access to financial services rather than elimination of exclusion as the immediate goal. The exploding microfinance movement is driven by this motivation (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Honohan, 2004b; Robinson, 2001) . Microfinance pioneers have emphasized the very high rates of return that can be earned by the poor and the near-poor, especially in urban and peri-urban settings, resulting in a high demand for borrowings even at high interest rates. Some microfinance institutions work on a credit-only basis, funding themselves from charitable donors and other sources; some employ forced savings elements to the loan scheme. The modern trend is to emphasize deposits as well as loans as key tool for efficient financial management, whether they represent precautionary savings, or a means of accumulating capital. Transactions accounts are also important for receiving and making internal and international remittances between family members. And microinsurance is beginning to be a significant element in the microfinance movement.
Does access to financial services through deposit or loan accounts reduce poverty?
Numerous anecdotes illustrate paths to relative prosperity being paved by such financial services. However, there is typically a large element of selection bias, both at the level of the individual client (with the more energetic likely to experience growing loan and deposit balances) and at the level of the village selected for establishment of a microfinance institution (sometimes this is a negative bias, as charitable sponsors seek out the more deprived villages). Furthermore, there can be displacement effects, with non-beneficiaries of microfinance suffering in local markets from the beneficiaries.
Despite an extensive quasi-promotional literature, detailed microeconometric analyses are, for these technical reasons, surprisingly non-committal about whether direct financial access has a major effect in reducing poverty (Honohan, 2004b 
Measuring Household Access to Financial Services
This section discusses some recent contributions to measuring access of households to various forms of intermediary accounts, and proposed a new composite cross-country indicator of the percentage of the adult population with access to some intermediary account. The new series has the advantage of wide coverage and the drawback of relying on imputations which, for some countries, will seem rather shaky.
In recent contributions, two basic approaches have been used to get to grips with the problem of measuring overall financial access (Honohan, 2005) . One is to go directly to households and survey their usage, whether as part of a wider household survey or a dedicated financial access survey. The other is to make inferences from data in the number of intermediary accounts. Here we propose a method of using overlaps between the country coverage of the different approaches to arrive at access estimates for 162
countries -or about three times the number of countries for which there is direct household survey data. Figure 2 presents the distribution across countries of number of microfinance accounts per 100 adult population using the WSBI series. It also shows the same for microfinance accounts that are not savings bank accounts (based on the CGAP numbers). It suggests a 6 Christen et al. define their coverage as including intermediaries that have a "double bottom-line", reflecting social (access to finance) as well as strictly commercial objectives. They include governmentowned development banks and savings banks. Scrutiny of the CGAP database revealed a handful of countries for which one or more large institutions was counted twice; adjustments to deal with this were made to the data for: BFA, LKA, MDG, NER, SEN, VNM. 7 A drawback here is that many of the banks added by the WSBI do not actually report the number of accounts; instead, for these banks, Peachey and Roe imputed account numbers on the assumption that the average account balance is 0.24 times annual mean per capita GDP in the country. For 15 countries estimated savings bank account numbers exceed 10 per cent of the national adult population. While their simplicity and retail emphasis makes the imputation much more realistic for most savings banks than it would be for commercial banks, it is questionable for a number of the WSBI member banks which have effectively evolved into full-service commercial banks. For this reason, we have made a new examination of all WSBI members for which the Peachey and Roe imputation method generates account numbers exceeding 12 per cent of the adult population, and made adjustments as set out in Annex 1 to AGO, BOL, CPV, MAR, MLT, MLI, MNG.
rather better access picture than indicated in earlier work, and in particular shows that ignoring the large government-sponsored savings banks leads to a considerable understatement of the number of bank accounts (though it should be noted that many of these savings banks do not offer credit services to individual customers);
A parallel exercise for banks was conducted mainly through a survey of banking regulators (Beck et al., 2005) . Data on the number of deposits at 1999-2000 was obtained for 45 countries -35 of them developing countries. (Data was also obtained in the same survey for average deposit size, the product of which with deposit numbers is a measure of monetary depth). However, this survey covers only those institutions regarded as "deposit money banks" and as such does not cover most microfinance institutions.
A number of difficulties arises in moving from these two databases to a reliable indicator of the proportion of households with financial access. The issue of dating is also relevant. The various sources relate to different dates for different financial intermediaries. Mostly these are about the year 2000 but there is considerable variation. For most countries it may safely be assumed that these numbers don't change dramatically within a few years, the rise of microfinance means that this is not necessarily true for all countries.
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The proportion of households with an account will in general differ from the proportion of adults. The numerator and denominator both change, though, so the difference may not be large. Some of the surveys are based on household units (such as those from the LSMS program); others, such as Finscope, use individual adults as the unit. Here we simply use survey data based on both concepts interchangeably. The question of how best to splice data from the two types of sources deserves further study, but would seem to require more overlapping data than exists.
There are other loose ends. For instance, while the accounts at ICBC are included in the WSBI data, the 146 million active personal deposit accounts at another large Chinese institution, the China Commercial Bank are not, essentially because it is not a member of the WSBI. Both of these banks would be included in the concept of "commercial banks"
employed by Beck et al. 2005 for their survey, though data for China has not been included in that survey.
Given these numerous difficulties it is heartening to discover that data on bank account numbers and on average bank account size (as a proportion of GDP) are quite closely correlated with household survey-based data on access percentages (Table A1, regressions A and B; and Figure 2 ). 11 The log-linear relationship is close enough to suggest using extrapolating fitted values for countries in which there is no household survey data available. Using the bank account database, this allows synthetic access percentages to be derived for about 45 countries.
Even more encouraging, for countries where both exist, the bank account numbers are quite highly correlated with the WSBI numbers (Table A1 , regression L). Thus, where the number of bank accounts is not known but the WSBI numbers are, we can use the fitted relationship to compute a substitute regressor. Using this substitute, we obtain G, which shows that the relation between accounts numbers and household survey data holds up well on a much wider sample. The coefficient values from G can then be used to approximate access percentages for all 138 countries in the WSBI database. As a further refinement, noting also the correlation between the deposit size data and GDP per capita (regression M) one can proceed in an analogous way using the fitted values from M as regressors in J, whose coefficient values in turn generates an alternative approximation to the access percentages. We call this alternative the synthetic access percentage.
A final adjustment is to replace this last mentioned synthetic access data with household survey-based data where available. The result is the composite indicator tabulated in income and access percentages, and the fact that, at any given mean income level, access percentages vary widely. It also displays three outliers as noted whose access estimates must be regarded as particularly unreliable. 13 However, the spread of the actual distribution out of sample is likely to be also understated by the deciles shown, given that the fitted value has a much lower standard deviation than the actual within sample. Despite the numerous shortcomings of the composite indicator, it has the great merit of distilling information from a variety of different sources and placing it on a common basis. No doubt the accuracy of the imputation for any given country may be highly questionable, but it can represent a first approximation to be revised as new data become available for each country. Furthermore, as a cross-country dataset, it has certainly potential for use in cross-country regression analysis, where econometric techniques can minimize the impact of stochastic errors.
Financial Access and Poverty: Is There a Cross-country Link?
While recognizing the shortcomings of the imputation procedures used to construct the composite indicator, as well as the limitations (outlined in the previous section) of the underlying data sources, the resulting dataset is nevertheless interesting. Appropriate econometric techniques can limit the consequences of random error.
Returning then to the question of whether financial access reduces poverty, we use the new access data to obtain a macro cross-country perspective on this issue.
Earlier work (using the CGAP data also described above) failed to find any significant cross-country correlation between the density of microfinance accounts and poverty rates (Honohan, 2004b) . But given the extensive differences between the old data and the new composite series, it is worth repeating the experiment.
14 Even though this variable captures the degree to which the banking system intermediates funds to the private sector, and not the overall resources of the banking system But first, as a precaution against getting carried away by correlations between variables of interest, it is worth looking at the extent to which our household access series is also correlated with other variables that may cause or be caused by it, or are, with access, jointly caused by some deeper variables.
In fact (Table 2 ) using any of the variants of the new data series presented in the previous section, we do find that access is correlated with the $1 per day poverty headcount rate.
This is true even of the microfinance-only data (referred to in the Appendix as the WSBI series -see regression 3.A). It is also true of the synthetic access percentages (3.E) or the main composite series (2.D). But access percentages are, as already shown by Figure 4 , strongly correlated with per capita income, 15 and since the latter is highly correlated with poverty rates, the more interesting question is whether access remains significant in a regression which also includes per capita income. In fact, when per capita income and other controls 16 found to be significant in earlier work (see 2.A-C) are added to the specification, none of the access series retains significance (2.E-F; 3B-C; 3F-G).
There are several wide outliers in these regressions, and as a robustness check we reestimated with two or three of these excluded (2H-N). Qualitatively the results are the same: access is significant on its own, but not when income and distribution variables are also included.
A similar exercise was conducted with the $2 per day poverty headcount as the dependent variable. Interestingly, the same pattern holds, as shown by the regressions reported in Table 5 . Financial access is correlated with the broader poverty definition but not when the effects of average income is controlled-for. Removal of outliers does not alter this picture.
15 In a regression of data on the summary access indicator for 144 countries, per capita income explains about 63 percent of cross country variation. After exclusion of 4 wide outliers (Hong Kong, Lebanon, Luxembourg and Macao) this jumps to over 73 percent. Apart from Luxembourg, the other three outliers should probably be omitted from most analyses with this data. 16 We include the mean income of the bottom 90 per cent, together with the percentage share of the top decile, instead of just the overall mean income, following Honohan (2004c) The next aspect to check is whether the lack of significance may be due to other omitted variables. (2004a,b) , despite the inclusion of the financial access variable, which remains insignificant. In other words, if development lowers poverty, it is in its depth dimension rather than the access dimension that this is evident in cross-country data.
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Interestingly, an interaction term between (bank credit) depth and access is significant and makes the access variable significant (Regressions 4Q-T). But the marginal effect of access (conditional on depth) is estimated in these equations to be positive only if the depth variable is well below its mean.
Finally, we look in Table 6 at the possible impact of financial access on inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. Once again, when the access variable is included on its 17 Since all variables related to monetary depth are highly correlated across country with inflation (because agents economize on money balances when inflation is high), it is prudent to include inflation as a control variable if monetary depth is being used as a structural measure of financial development (Honohan, 2004a) . 18 Regressions 4Y-AD show that the depth variable remains significant even if fewer of the outliers from regression 4B are excluded. 19 The institutional variables, when significant, tend to have a counterintuitive sign-better institutions meaning more poverty-but these coefficients are not robust.
own it is significant and has the expected negative sign (Regression 6A). However, when per capita income or a sub-Saharan Africa dummy (or both) are included, access is no longer significant (Regressions 6B-C). However, when banking depth is also included (an action which lowers the available list of countries on the data set employed to 74), 20 while depth is not significant, access becomes so (6D-E), whether or not the institutional and policy controls are also included (6F-G). The size of the estimated impact (for this restricted sample) is sizable but not unrealistic: an increase of ten percent in access is associated with a 0.6 percentage point lower Gini coefficient.
In the absence of plausible instruments, all of the reported regressions have used ordinary least squares rather than an instrumental variables estimator. This is not likely to be as serious a problem when the dependent variable is poverty count or inequality, as it would be if the equations were trying to explain income levels and growth. 
Concluding Remarks
For low-income countries, the relevant question for poor households is not how much financial assets they have, but whether they have access to financial intermediaries at all.
We have drawn on and synthesized recent work by several authors using information provided by banks and micro-finance institutions in combination with household survey data to produce estimates of access percentages for some 160 countries. These estimates can be progressively refined as the results of a new wave of access surveys currently under way or planned become available.
The new access percentages are negatively correlated across countries with poverty headcount rates, whether at the $1 a day or $2 a day thresholds. But the correlation is not a robust one and loses significance in multiple regressions that include mean per capita income. At the same time, the more conventional measure of financial development, 20 And this is the main reason for the significance-as is shown by Regression 6E. 21 Of course there could still be an endogeneity problem, for example, if both poverty and access were driven by a common unobserved factor. But what is absent here is the kind of automatic feedback from average income to financial depth that makes instrumenting essential in the causal analysis of finance and growth, for example.
namely banking (credit) depth, does retain significant explanatory power in this data.
Thus the supposed anti-poverty potential of financial access remains econometrically elusive.
Even if does not strongly help explain absolute poverty, financial access is negatively correlated with income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. This might be interpreted as implying that access to an account at a formal intermediary does more for those somewhat higher up the ladder than the $2 a day poor.
However one reads the evidence on the impact of direct access of the poor to financial services, the findings of the paper reemphasize the importance of wider financial development, with its favorable impact both on economic growth and on the degree to which growth is pro-poor. Peachey and Roe (2006) as revised for this paper; Synth(etic) is the predicted share using the estimated regression J in Table A1 ; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Section 2 -Mark IIIa of the composite series was used here). Source for poverty (from last available survey before 2004) and GNI (1999, measured at PPP): WDI. -345.5 ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Cross section: all available countries. WSBI is the data in Peachey and Roe (2006) as revised for this paper; Synth(etic) is the predicted share using the estimated regression J in Table A1 ; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Section 2 -Mark IIIa of the composite series was used here). Source for poverty (from last available survey before 2004) and GNI (1999, measured at PPP): WDI. . Peachey and Roe (2006) as revised for this paper; Synth(etic) is the predicted share using the estimated regression J in Table A1 ; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Section 2 -Mark IIIa of the composite series was used here). Source for poverty (from last available survey before 2004) and GNI (1999, measured at PPP): WDI; source for inflation (geometric average of CPI 1990 (geometric average of CPI -2000 and private credit ( Peachey and Roe (2006) as revised for this paper; Synth(etic) is the predicted share using the estimated regression J in Table A1 ; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Section 2 -Mark IIIa of the composite series was used here). Source for poverty (from last available survey before 2004) and GNI (1999, measured at PPP): WDI. Peachey and Roe (2006) as revised for this paper; Synth(etic) is the predicted share using the estimated regression J in Table A1 ; Comp(osite) is based on household survey data where available, otherwise Synth (see Section 2 -Mark IIIa of the composite series was used here). Source for inequality (from last available survey before 2004) and GNI (1999, measured at PPP): WDI. NB: The sample for equation 6.E was the set of countries for which all the data for regression 6D was available. There were no large outliers in 6D-G. Table 1 . The map includes eight countries not listed in Table 1 by assuming that AUS, ISL and NZL are in the highest category; COD (formerly ZAR), GNB, TCD, MRT and SOM in the lowest category.
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